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Abstract. Incremental processing at least as fine grained as word-by-word has long been ac-
cepted as a basic feature of human processing of speech (see e.g., Schlesewsky and Bornkessel
(2004)) and as an important feature for design of spoken dialogue systems (see e.g., Schlangen
and Skantze (2009); Hough et al. (2015)). Nonetheless, with a few important exceptions (see
e.g., Kempson et al. (2016)), incrementality is viewed as an aspect of performance, not semantic
meaning. Moreover, it seems to entail giving up on compositionality as a constraining princi-
ple on denotations. In this paper, we point to a variety of dialogical phenomena whose analysis
incontrovertibly requires a semantics formulated in incremental terms. These include cases,
above all with sluicing, that call into question existing assumptions about ellipsis resolution
and argue for incremental updating of QUD. The incremental semantic framework we sketch
improves on existing such accounts (reviewed in Peldszus and Schlangen (2012); Hough et al.
(2015)) on both denotational and contextual fronts: the contents we posit are in fact tightly
constrained by a methodological principle more restrictive than traditional compositionality,
namely the Reprise Content Hypothesis (Purver and Ginzburg (2004); Ginzburg and Purver
(2012); Cooper (2013a)), embedded within independently motivated dialogue states (Ginzburg
(2012)).
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1. Introduction
Incremental processing at least as fine grained as word-by-word has long been accepted as a
basic feature of human processing of speech (see e.g., Schlesewsky and Bornkessel (2004))
and as an important feature for design of spoken dialogue systems (see e.g., Schlangen and
Skantze (2009); Hough et al. (2015)). Nonetheless, with a few important exceptions (see e.g.,
Kempson et al. (2016)), incrementality is viewed as an aspect of performance, not semantic
meaning. Moreover, it seems to entail giving up on compositionality as a constraining principle
on denotations. In this paper, we point to a variety of dialogical phenomena whose analysis
incontrovertibly requires a semantics formulated in incremental terms. These include cases,
above all with sluicing, that call into question existing assumptions about ellipsis resolution
and argue for incremental updating of QUD. The incremental semantic framework we sketch
improves on existing such accounts (reviewed in Peldszus and Schlangen (2012); Hough et al.
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the Deutsche Forschunggemeinschaft (DFG). For Hough and Schlangen: this work was supported by the Cluster
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(2015)) on both denotational and contextual fronts: the contents we posit are in fact tightly
constrained by a methodological principle more restrictive than traditional compositionality,
namely the Reprise Content Hypothesis (Purver and Ginzburg (2004); Ginzburg and Purver
(2012); Cooper (2013a)), embedded within independently motivated dialogue states (Ginzburg
(2012)).
The structure of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we introduce the data and draw from it basic
specifications for incremental semantics. In section 3 we present the necessary background
concerning KOS and Type Theory with Records, the frameworks we employ for representing
dialogue, grammar, and semantics. In section 4, we sketch an account of dialogical incremental
processing, which we apply to the data from section 2 in section 5. We end with some brief
conclusions.
2. Why Semantics needs Incrementality : the Data and Initial specification
(1) exemplifies the fact that at any point in the speech stream of A’s utterance B can interject
with an acknowledgement whose force amounts to B understanding the initial segment of the
utterance (Clark (1996)):
(1) A: Move the train . . . B: Aha A: . . . from Avon . . . B: Right A: . . . to Danville. (Trains
corpus)
(1) requires us to be able to write a lexical entry for ‘aha’ and ‘yeah’ (and their counterparts
cross linguistically, e.g., French: ‘ouais’, ‘mmh’,. . . , ) whose context is/includes “an incom-
plete utterance”. (2a,b,c) exemplify a contrast between three reactions to an ‘abandoned’ utter-
ance: in (2a) B asks A to elaborate, whereas in (2b) she asks him to complete her unfinished
utterance; in (2c) B indicates that A’s content is evident and he need not spell it out:
(2) a. A(i): John . . . Oh never mind. B(ii): What about John/What happened to John? A:
He’s a lovely chap but a bit disconnected. / # burnt himself while cooking last night.
b. A(i): John . . . Oh never mind. B(ii): John what? A: # He’s a lovely chap but a bit
disconnected. / burnt himself while cooking last night.
c. A: Bill is . . . B: Yeah don’t say it, we know.
(2a,b,c) requires us to associate a content with A’s incomplete utterance which can either trigger
an elaboration query (2a), a query about utterance completion (2b), or an acknowledgement of
understanding (2c). (3) is an attested example of an abandoned utterance in mid-word:
(3) [Context: A is in the kitchen searching for the always disappearing scissors. As he
walks towards the cutlery drawer he begins to make his utterance, before discovering
the scissors once the drawer is opened.] A: Who took the sci-. . .
(3) requires us to integrate within-utterance and (in this case, visual) dialogue context process-
ing.
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(4) exemplifies two types of expressions—filled pauses and exclamative interjections—that can
in principle, be inserted at any point in the speech stream of A’s utterance; the interjection ‘Oh
God’ here reacts to the utterance situation conveyed incrementally.
(4) Audrey: Well it’s like th- it’s like the erm (pause) oh God! I’ve forgotten what it’s
bloody called now? (British National Corpus)
(4) requires us to enable the coherence of a question about what word/phrase will follow, es-
sentially at any point in the speech stream; It also requires us to enable the coherence of an
utterance expressing negative evaluation of the current incomplete utterance. (5a-e) illustrate
that an incomplete clause can serve as an antecedent for a sluice, thereby going against the
commonly held assumption that sluicing is an instance of ‘S-ellipsis’ (Merchant (2001)):
(5) a. The translation is by—who else?—Doris Silverstein (The TLS, Feb 2016)
b. He saw—can you guess who?—The Dude;
c. Queen Rhonda is dead. Long live . . . who? (New York Times, Nov 2015);
d. A: A really annoying incident. Some idiot, B: Who? A: Not clear. B: OK A: has
taken the kitchen scissors.
e. A: Someone I’m not saying who / B: No, do say/Who?
(5) requires us to enable either incomplete argument frames or QNPs immediately after their
utterance to trigger sluices.
3. Background
3.1. KoS
For our dialogical framework we use KoS (Ginzburg (1994); Larsson (2002); Purver (2006);
Ginzburg (2012). KoS provides a cognitive architecture in which there is no single common
ground, but distinct yet coupled Dialogue GameBoards, one per conversationalist. The struc-
ture of the dialogue gameboard (DGB) is given in table 1. The Spkr and Addr fields allow
one to track turn ownership; Facts represents conversationally shared assumptions; VisualSit
represents the dialogue participant’s view of the visual situation and attended entities; Pending,
the nature of which we explicate in more detail below, represents moves that are in the pro-
cess of being grounded and Moves represents moves that have been grounded; QUD tracks the
questions currently under discussion, though not simply questions qua semantic objects, but
pairs of entities which we call InfoStrucs: a question and an antecedent sub-utterance.2 This
latter entity provides a partial specification of the focal (sub)utterance, and hence it is dubbed
the focus establishing constituent (FEC). This is similar to the parallel element in higher order
unification-based approaches to ellipsis resolution e.g. Gardent and Kohlhase (1997); and to
Vallduvı´ (2015), who relates the focus establishing constituent with a notion needed to capture
contrast.
2Extensive motivation for this view of QUD can be found in (Ferna´ndez, 2006; Ginzburg, 2012), based primar-
ily on semantic and syntactic parallelism in non-sentential utterances such as short answers, sluicing, and various
other non-sentential utterances.
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Dialogue Gameboard
component type keeps track of
Spkr Individual Turn
Addr Individual ownership
utt-time Time
Facts Set(propositions) Shared assumptions
VisualSit Situation Visual scene
Moves List(Locutionary propositions) Grounded utterances
QUD Partially ordered Live
set(hquestion, FECi) issues
Pending List(Locutionary propositions) Ungrounded utterances
Table 1: Dialogue Gameboard
3.2. TTR
The logical underpinnings of KoS is Type Theory with Records (TTR) (Cooper (2012); Cooper
and Ginzburg (2015)). TTR is a framework that draws its inspirations from two quite distinct
sources. One source is Constructive Type Theory for the repertory of type constructors, and in
particular records and record types, and the notion of witnessing conditions. The second source
is situation semantics (Barwise (1989)) which TTR follows in viewing semantics as ontology
construction. This is what underlies the emphasis on specifying structures in a model theoretic
way, introducing structured objects for explicating properties, propositions, questions etc. It
also takes from situation semantics an emphasis on partiality as a key feature of information
processing. This aspect is exemplified in a key assumption of TTR—the witnessing relation
between records and record types: the basic relationship between the two is that a record r is of
type RT if each value in r assigned to a given label li satisfies the typing constraints imposed
by RT on li:
(6) record witnessing
The record:
26664
l1 = a1
l2 = a2
. . .
ln = an
37775
is of type:
26664
l1 : T1
l2 : T2(l1)
. . .
ln : Tn(l1, l2, . . . , ln 1)
37775
iff a1 : T1,a2 : T2(a1), . . . ,an : Tn(a1,a2, . . . ,an 1)
This allows for cases where there are fields in the record with labels not mentioned in the record
type. This is important when e.g., records are used to model contexts and record types model
rules about context change—we do not want to have to predict in advance all information that
could be in a context when writing such rules.
For what follows, we require use of an analog to priority unification for record types in asym-
metric merge (Cooper, 2012; Hough, 2015) defined as: given two record types R1 and R2,
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R1 .^ R2 will yield a record type which is the union of all fields with labels not shared by R1
and R2 and the asymmetric merge of the remaining fields with the same labels, whereby R2’s
type values take priority over R1’s fields, yielding a resulting record type with R2’s fields only
in those cases.
(7) Asymmetric Merge
24a:T1b:T2
c:T3
35 .^ b:T2c:T4
 
=
24a:T1b:T2
c:T4
35
3.2.1. Conversational Rules
Context change is specified in terms of conversational rules, rules that specify the effects ap-
plicable to a DGB that satisfies certain preconditions. This allows both illocutionary effects
to be modelled (preconditions for and effects of greeting, querying, assertion, parting etc.), in-
terleaved with locutionary effects. We mention here three rules used subsequently. The first
two concern the incrementation of QUD. (8a)3 specifies that given the LatestMove being q, q
becomes maximal in QUD, whereas (8b) concerns the effect of A asserting p: this raises the
issue p?—the responder can then either decide to discuss this issue (as a consequence of the
rule QSPEC introduced below as (9)) or accept it as positively resolved (as a consequence of a
rule we do not mention here):
(8) a. Ask QUD-incrementation b. Assertion QUD-incrementation
266664
pre =
"
q : Question
LatestMove = Ask(spkr,addr,q): IllocProp
#
effects =

qud =
D
q,r⇤.qud
E
: poset(Question)
 
377775
266664
pre =
"
p : Prop
LatestMove = Assertion(spkr,addr,p): IllocProp
#
effects =

qud =
D
p?,r⇤.qud
E
: poset(Question)
 
377775
QSPEC is KoS’ version of Gricean Relevance—it characterizes the contextual background of
reactive queries and assertions. QSPEC says that if q is QUD-maximal, then subsequent to this
either conversational participant may make a move constrained to be q-specific (i.e. either a
partial answer or sub-question of q).4
3Throughout in update rules we will use r⇤ to refer to the immediately preceding information state which is
required to be of the type in the field labelled by ‘pre’ or ‘preconditions’.
4We notate the underspecification of the turn holder as TurnUnderspec, an abbreviation for the following
specification which gets unified together with the rest of the rule:26666666664
PrevAud =
n
pre.spkr,pre.addr
o
: Set(Ind)
spkr : Ind
c1 : member(spkr, PrevAud)
addr : Ind
c2 : member(addr, PrevAud)
^ addr 6= spkr
37777777775
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(9) QSPEC266666666666664
pre =

qud =
D
i, I
E
: poset(InfoStruc)
 
effects = TurnUnderspec
.^
2666664
r : AbSemObj
R: IllocRel
LatestMove =
R(spkr,addr,r) : IllocProp
c1 : Qspecific(r,i.q)
3777775
377777777777775
Update procedure: Using asymmetric merge, we employ the following update process for a
dialogue contextC and for some rule R, a record of type (10).
(10)

pre : RecType
effects : RecType
 
When updating from one contextCi to the nextCi+1 with rule R:
(11) If Ci : TCi and TCi is a subtype of R.pre,
then R licenses the conclusion that:
Ci+1 : TCi .^ R.effects
The updates operate on various levels of information which can be arbitrarily fine-grained (even
phonetic). This gives us the requisite apparatus for the incrementality discussed in section 2.
3.3. The Reprise Content Hypothesis and Generalized Quantifiers
As a means of tightly constraining semantic denotations, we adopt the Reprise Content Hy-
pothesis (RCH, Purver and Ginzburg, 2004; Ginzburg and Purver, 2012; Cooper, 2013a):
(12) A fragment reprise question queries exactly the standard semantic content of the frag-
ment being reprised.
This uses the data from responses to clarification questions about a constituent as indicative
of its content (e.g., A: Most students object to the proposal. B: Most students? A: Carl, Max,
and Minnie.). Purver and Ginzburg (2004) and Ginzburg and Purver (2012) use such data
to argue in favour of witness sets rather than higher order entities as denotations of QNPs,
whereas Cooper (2013a) refines Purver and Ginzburg’s account and shows how the RCH can
be maintained using a GQ-based perspective. Using the RCH as a methodological principle
for positing denotations can be applied straightforwardly in an incremental setting. It offers a
stronger constraint than Fregean/Montogovian compositionality which leaves underdetermined
which part contributes what—it fulfills the criteria of what Milward (1991) calls incremental
representation and strongly incremental interpretation.
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3.4. Grounding/Clarification interaction Conditions
Much recent work in dialogue has emphasized two essential branches that can ensue in the
aftermath of an utterance:
• Grounding: the utterance is understood, its content is added to common ground, uptake
occurs.
• Clarification Interaction: some aspect of the utterance causes a problem; this triggers
exchange to repair problem.
KoS’s treatment of repair involves two aspects. One is straightforward, drawing on an early
insight of Conversation Analysis (Schegloff (2007)), namely that repair can involve ‘putting
aside’ an utterance for a while, a while during which the utterance is repaired. That in itself
can be effected without further ado by adding further structure to the DGB, specifically the
field introduced above called Pending. ‘Putting the utterance aside’ raises the issue of what is it
that we are ‘putting aside?’. In other words, how do we represent the utterance? The requisite
information needs to be such that it enables the original speaker to interpret and recognize
the coherence of the range of possible clarification queries that the original addressee might
make. Ginzburg (2012) offers detailed arguments on this issue, including considerations of
the phonological/syntactic parallelism exhibited between CRs and their antecedents and the
existence of CRs whose function is to request repetition of (parts of) an utterance. Taken
together with the obvious need for Pending to include values for the contextual parameters
specified by the utterance type, Ginzburg concludes that the type of Pending combines tokens of
the utterance, its parts, and of the constituents of the content with the utterance type associated
with the utterance. An entity that fits this specification is the locutionary proposition defined
by the utterance. A locutionary proposition is a proposition whose situational component is an
utterance situation, typed as in (13a) and will have the form of record (13b):
(13) a. LocProp=def
"
sit : Sign
sit-type : RecType
#
b.
"
sit = u
sit-type = Tu
#
Here Tu is a grammatical type for classifying u that emerges during the process of parsing u. It
can be identified with a sign in the sense of Head Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG,
Pollard and Sag, 1994). This is operationalized as follows: given a presupposition that u is the
most recent speech event and that Tu is a grammatical type that classifies u, a record pu of the
form (13b), gets added to Pending. The two branches lead to the following alternative updates:
• Grounding, utterance u understood: update MOVES with pu and respond appropriately
(with the second half of an adjacency pair etc.)
• Clarification Interaction:
1. pu remains for future processing in PENDING;
2. CQ(u), a clarification question calculated from pu, updates QUD and CQ(u) be-
comes a discourse topic.
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4. An incremental perspective on grounding and clarification
4.1. Incrementalizing dialogue processing
The account in section 3.4 was extended to self-repair in Ginzburg et al. (2014): the basic
idea is simply to incrementalize the perspective from the turn level to the word level: as the
utterance unfolds incrementally there potentially arise questions about what has happened so
far (e.g. what did the speaker mean with sub-utterance u1?) or what is still to come (e.g. what
word does the speaker mean to utter after sub-utterance u2?). These can be accommodated into
the context if either uncertainty about the correctness of a sub-utterance arises or the speaker
has planning or realizational problems. Overt examples for such accommodation are provided
by self-addressed questions (She saw the . . . what’s the word?, Je suis comment dire?), as ex-
plained below.
The account of Ginzburg et al. (2014) exemplified some incremental contents and explained
a significant conceptual change that would need to be assumed—that Pending would have
incremental utterance representations. It did not, however, begin to spell out concretely the
nature of such representations, which are crucial in a third option a speaker has apart from
grounding and (self)clarifying, namely prediction (see examples (2) and (3) above).
We can summarize this picture of processing as in (14), the monitoring and update/clarification
cycle is modified to happen at the end of each word utterance event, and in case of the need for
repair, a repair question gets accommodated into QUD.
(14) a. Ground: continue (Levelt (1983)).
b. Predict: stop, since content is predictable.
c. (Self)Clarify: generate CR given lack of expected utterance.
In the rest of this section we sketch an account of incremental utterance representations, in-
cluding in particular incremental semantic contents.
4.2. Update Rules for specifying syntax
An essential presupposition of our approach (already in its non-incremental version, see above)
is a view of syntax as speech event classification by an agent. For a very detailed exposition
of such a view see Cooper (2016), a pre´cis of which can be found in Cooper (2013b). Starting
at the word level—if Lex(Tw, C) is one of the lexical resources available to an agent A (e.g.,
Lex(‘Beethoven’, NP) or Lex(‘a’, Det)) and A judges an event e to be of type Tw, then A is
licensed to update their DGB with the type Lex(Tw,C). Intuitively, this means that if the agent
hears an utterance of the word “composer”, then they can conclude that they have heard a sign
which has the category noun. This is the beginning of parsing, which Cooper shows how to
assimilate to a kind of update akin to that involved in non-linguistic event perception such as
route finding. The licensing condition corresponding to lexical resources like (14) is given in
(15). We will return below to how this relates to gameboard update. (15) says that an agent
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with lexical resource Lex(T , C) who judges a speech event, u, to be of type T is licensed to
judge that there is a sign of type Lex(T , C) whose ‘s-event.e’-field contains u.
(15) If Lex(T ,C) is a resource available to agent A, then for any u, u :A T licenses :A Lex(T ,
C) .^
⇥
s-event:
⇥
e=u:T
⇤⇤
Strings of utterances of words can be classified as utterances of phrases. That is, speech events
are hierarchically organized into types of speech events in a way akin to the complex event
structures needed to model activities such as route finding. Agents have resources which allow
them to reclassify a string of signs of certain types (“the daughters”) into a single sign of another
type (“the mother”). For instance, a string of type Det_N (that is, a concatenation of an event
of type Det and an event of type N) can lead us to the conclusion that we have observed a sign
of type NP whose daughters are of the type Det_N.
The resource that licences this is a rule which modelled as the function in (16a) which we
represent as (16b).
(16) a. lu : Det_N . NP .^
⇥
syn:
⇥
daughters=u:Det_N
⇤⇤
b. RuleDaughters(NP, Det_N)
‘RuleDaughters’ is to be the function in (17). Thus ‘RuleDaughters’, if provided with a subtype
of Sign+ and a subtype of Sign as arguments, will return a function which maps a string of signs
of the first type to the second type with the restriction that the daughters field is filled by the
string of signs:
(17) lT1 : Type .
lT2 : Type .
lu : T1 . T2 .^
⇥
syn:
⇥
daughters=u:T1
⇤⇤
4.3. Semantic Composition using asymmetric merge
As we mentioned in section 3.2.1, we use asymmetric merge to integrate utterances into the
DGB. We postulate as the denotation associated with the root of the tree the type illocutionary
proposition, which is hence compatible with declarative, interrogative and imperative utter-
ances. This gets refined as each word gets introduced using asymmetric merge, which enables
us to effect a combinatory operation that synthesises function application and unification.
We exemplify how this works in explicating the evolution of the speaker’s information state in
example (3), repeated here as (18).
(18) [Context: J is in the kitchen searching for the always disappearing scissors. As he
walks towards the cutlery drawer he begins to make his utterance, before discovering
the scissors once the drawer is opened.] J: Who took the sci-. . .
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Before the first word we assume that the speaker has the question ‘who took the scissors’ (which
we denote here with q0) on his agenda, in the private part of his information state;5 in his visual
field he can see no scissors:6
(19) InfState0 : T0 where T0 is264private.agenda =
D
ask(s,q0)
E
:
D
Type
E
DGB.FACTS =
n
. . .¬9xIn(Vis  sit,x.scissors(x)) . . .
o
:
n
Type
o
375
We assume that an utterance, u1, of an interrogative NP such as who results in the update in
(20). The content associated with the utterance involves projection in a sense we explicate
shortly. Here it is projected to be a question of type WhPQ as in (20), a function from records
that include a person x into propositions involving a predication P(x).
(20) (

x:Ind
c:person(x)
 
!RecType)
P is of type Pred, that is (Ind!RecType), the type of functions from individuals to record types.
The function, w, which serves as the incremental content (cf. Milward and Cooper, 1994) of
who is given in (21).7
(21) w = lP:Pred . l r:

x:Ind
c:person(x)
 
. P(r.x)
Now the updated information state is characterized in (22).
(22) InfState1 : T0 .^2664DGB.Pending =
2664
sit =u1 : Sit
sit-type=
"
phon : who
cont = w: (Pred!WhPQ)
#
:RecType
3775: RecType
3775
We denote the type computed in (22) by T1. We take content of the verb took to be (23a)
(ignoring tense) of type (23b). We represent this content as ‘take0’.
(23) a. take0 = ly:Ind . lx:Ind .
⇥
e:take(x,y)
⇤
b. (Ind!Pred)
Thus the incremental content of who took can be computed in line with Milward and Cooper
(1994) as (24a) which can be expressed with reference to InfState1 as (24b).
5This is not a necessary assumption—presumably many utterances are partially planned as their generation
starts, hence the occurrence of some filled pauses to buy the speaker planning time.
6We assume this visual field is part of the speaker’s DGB, which is again a simplification, since it need not be
(quasi)-shared.
7Milward and Cooper (1994) offer an explicit procedure that converts such lambda terms to existentially quan-
tified propositions. Their fragment considered only declarative utterances. In the current work we could adapt
their procedure to yield existentially quantified illocutionary propositions.
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(24) a. ly:Ind . w(take0(y)) b. ly:Ind . InfoState1.DGB.Pending.sit-type.cont(take0(y))
We abbreviate (24b) as wt. We can compute a type for InfState2 as in (25).
(25) InfState2 : T1 .^2664DGB.Pending =
2664
sit =u2:Sit
sit-type=
"
phon : who took
cont = wt : (Ind!WhPQ)
#
:RecType
3775:RecType
3775
We use T2 to represent the type computed in (25). J opens the drawer and sees the scissors
there. This updates the DGB facts with a fact that the scissors are in the visual field. This, in
turn, implies that no one took the scissors, and hence, given the existence of a resolving answer
to the question, the original motivation for asking it is eliminated. We can now compute a type
for the next information state, InfState3, as in (26).
(26) InfState3 = T2 .^
26666664
private.agenda =
D E
:
D
Type
E
DGB.FACTS =
8>><>>:. . .
264x:Indc:scissors(x)
In(VisSit,x )
375. . .
9>>=>>;:
n
Type
o
37777775
4.4. Pending and charts
Information included in the ‘Pending’-field of the dialogue gameboard includes a type that
represents the agent’s view of the ongoing parse as the utterance unfolds. We call this type
a chart-type because we appeal to a notion of chart parsing for this purpose, though as will
become clear our approach is compatible with various other approaches for such representa-
tions, for instance Hough’s graph-based representation (Hough (2015)) which synthesizes a
graph-based Dynamic Syntax view of parsing (Sato (2011)) with the Incremental Unit (IU)
framework of Schlangen and Skantze (2011) for incremental processing.
The type of Pending remains LocProp, as in (27). The issues that remains is how to explicate
Tchart in order to understand how incremental content arises.
(27)
"
sit = s
sit-type = Tchart
#
We present here the briefest sketch of chart parsing as it is used in computational linguistics;
for a recent textbook introduction to chart parsing see Jurafsky and Martin (2009), Chap. 13,
whereas for its implementation in TTR see Cooper (2016). The idea of a chart is that it should
store all the hypotheses made during the processing of an utterance which in turn allow us to
compute new hypotheses to be added to the chart. Charts can be updated incrementally for
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each word and they can represent several live possibilities in a single data structure. We will
say that a chart is a record and we will use our resources to compute a chart type on the basis
of utterance events.
4.5. Charts: a simplified example
Suppose that we have so far heard an utterance of the word Dudamel. At this point we will say
that the type of the chart is (28)
(28)

e1 : “Dudamel”
e :
⇥
e1:start(e1)
⇤
_
⇥
e1:end(e1)
⇤  
The main event of the chart type (represented by the e-field) breaks the phonological event
of type “Dudamel” down into a string of two events, the start and the end of the “Dudamel”-
event.8 Thus (28) records that we have observed an event of the phonological type “Dudamel”
and an event consisting of the start of that event followed by the end of that event. Given that
we have the resource LexPropName(“Dudamel”, d) available, we can update (28) to (29):
(29)
2664
e1 : “Dudamel”
e2 : LexPropName(“Dudamel”, d) .^
⇥
s-event:
⇥
e=e1:Phon
⇤ ⇤
e :

e1:start(e1)
e2:start(e2)
 
_

e1:end(e1)
e2:end(e2)
 
3775
That is, we add the information to the chart that there is an event (labelled ‘e2’) of the type
which is the sign type corresponding to “Dudamel” and that the event which is the speech
event referred to in that sign type is the utterance event, labelled by ‘e1’. Furthermore the
duration of the event labelled ‘e2’ is the same as that labelled ‘e1’.
The type LexPropName(“Dudamel”, d) is a subtype of NP. Thus the event labelled ‘e2’ could be
the first item in a string that would be appropriate for the function which we have abbreviated
as (30a), which has the type (30b).
(30) a. S  ! NP VP | NP0(VP0) b. (NP_VP! Type)
Cooper (2016) argues for an analogy between non-linguistic event prediction and the prediction
that occurs in parsing.9 So on observing a noun-phrase event one can predict that it might be
followed by a verb phrase event thus creating a sentence event. We add a hypothesis event to
our chart which takes place at the end of the noun-phrase event as in (31).10
8These starting and ending events correspond to what are standardly called vertices in the chart parsing litera-
ture.
9Indeed he suggests that this might extend to non-linguistic event prediction among non-humans, e.g., the
prediction by a dog playing Fetch that it should run after a stick which is held up.
10In terms of the traditional chart parsing terminology this corresponds to an active edge involving a dotted
rule. The fact that the addition of this type to the chart type is triggered by finding something of an appropriate
type to be the leftmost element in a string that would be an appropriate argument to the rule corresponds to what
is called a left-corner parsing strategy.
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(31)
26666666666664
e1 : “Dudamel”
e2 : LexPropName(“Dudamel”, d) .^
⇥
s-event:
⇥
e=e1:Phon
⇤ ⇤
e3 :
2664
rule=S  ! NP VP | NP0(VP0):(NP_VP! Type)
fnd=e2:Sign
req=VP:Type
e:required(req,rule)
3775
e :

e1:start(e1)
e2:start(e2)
 
_
24e1:end(e1)e2:end(e2)
e3:start(e3)_end(e3)
35
37777777777775
In the e3-field the ‘rule’-field is for a syntactic rule, that is, a function from a string of signs of
a given type to a type. The ‘fnd’-field is for a sign or string of signs so far found which match
an initial segment of a string of the type required by the rule. The ‘req’-field is the type of the
remaining string required to satisfy the rule as expressed in the ‘e’-field. This hypothesis event
both starts and ends at the end of the event of the noun-phrase event e2.
In what follows, we will adopt a simplified version of (31), exemplified in (32). We will omit
the ‘e field’.
(32)
2666666666666666664
e1 : “Dudamel”
e2 : LexNP(“Dudamel”) .^

s-event :
h
e = e1 : Phon
i 
e3 :
26666666664
fnd = e2 : Sign
req =
"
cat = VP : Syncat
cont : (Ind! Prop)
#
: Type
proj =
264s-event :fnd.phon _req.phoncat = S
cont =req.cont(fnd.cont) : Prop
375: Type
37777777775
3777777777777777775
5. Incremental Dialogue Processing: principles and examples
With a basic means of representing utterances in progress, we can now formulate certain prin-
ciples which will serve to help explicate the phenomena discussed in section 2.
5.1. Utterance Projection
The first principle we introduce corresponds to the ‘stop option’ in our utterance protocol
(14b)—it says that if one projects that an utterance will continue in a certain way, then one
can actually use this prediction to update one’s DGB. This is of course a dangerous principle to
apply in an unconstrained fashion, and would ideally be formulated using probabilities about
the projection, for instance using the framework of Cooper et al. (2015), though we do not do
so here. (33) is an update rule which moves a locutionary proposition from pending to Latest-
Move. (r⇤ represents the previous information state which is required to be of the type labelled
‘preconds’.)
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(33) Utterance Projection26664preconds =
"
pending.sit : Sign
pending.sit-type.proj : Type
#
effects = TurnUnderspec .^
h
LatestMove = r⇤ : LocProp
i
37775
We exemplify an incremental view of the latest move that is being moved in (33) with a word-
by-word evolution of the latest move, analogous to that in section 4.3, but this time for an initial
segment of a declarative utterance: Jo. . . saw. . .
(34) a.
2666666666664
sit = u1
sit-type=
2666666664
phon : “Jo”
dgb-params :
"
j : Ind
s0 : Rec
#
cont = lP:Pred .
24sit = s0
sit-type =
h
c1:P(j)
i35: (Pred!Prop)
3777777775
3777777777775
b.
2666666666664
sit = u2
sit-type=
2666666664
phon : “Jo saw”
dgb-params :
"
j : Ind
s0 : Rec
#
cont = lx:Ind .
24sit = s0
sit-type =
h
c1:Saw(j,x)
i35: (Ind!Prop)
3777777775
3777777777775
5.2. Forward-Looking Disfluencies
Forward-looking disfluencies are disfluencies where the moment of interruption is followed not
by an alteration, but just by a completion of the utterance which is delayed by a filled or unfilled
pause (hesitation) or a repetition of a previously uttered part of the utterance (repetitions). As
we mentioned with respect to example (4) and in our discussion in section 4.1, we need a
means of enabling at any point in the speech stream the emergence of a question about what
is still to come in the current utterance. Forward Looking Disfluencies involve the update rule
in (35)—given a context where an initial segment of utterance by A has taken place, the next
speaker—underspecified between the current one and the addressee—may address the issue of
what A intended to say next by providing a co-propositional utterance:
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(35) Forward Looking Utterance Rule:266666666666666666664
preconds =
266664
spkr : Ind
addr : Ind
pending.sit-type :
"
fnd : Sign
req: Sign
#
377775
effects = TurnUnderspec .^
2666666664
MaxQud =24q = lx:Ind . MeanNextUtt(r⇤.spkr,r⇤.fnd,x)
fec =
no 35: InfoStruc
LatestMove : LocProp
c2: Copropositional(LatestMovecontent,MaxQud)
3777777775
377777777777777777775
A consequence of (35), is that it offers the potential to explain cases like (36). In the after-
math of a filled pause an issue along the lines of the one we have posited as the effect of the
conversational rule (35) actually gets uttered:
(36) a. Carol 133Well it’s (pause) it’s (pause) er (pause) what’s his name? Bernard Matthews’
turkey roast. (BNC, KBJ)
b. They’re pretty ... um, how can I describe the Finns? They’re quite an unusual crowd
actually.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2010/sep/10/small-talk-steve-backley-interview
On our account such utterances are licensed because these questions are co-propositional with
the issue ‘what did A mean to say after u0?’. This suggests that a different range of such
questions will occur depending on the identity of (the syntactic/semantic type of) u0. This
expectation is met, as discussed in Tian et al. (2016), who also discuss cross-linguistic variation
with SAQs in English, Chinese, and Japanese.
5.3. Prediction and Clarification for incomplete utterances
We return now to (2a,b), repeated here as (37):
(37) a. A(i): John . . . Oh never mind. B(ii): What about John? A: He’s a lovely chap but a
bit disconnected. / # burnt himself while cooking last night.
b. A(i): John . . . Oh never mind. B(ii): John what? A: burnt himself while cooking last
night. / # He’ss a lovely chap but a bit disconnected.
Whether (2a) or (2b) arise depends on whether one uses utterance projection or the forward
looking utterance rule. For the former, as we showed in (34), an initial referential NP when
prediction is applied results in (roughly) the projected content in (38). Thus, given the con-
versational rule QSPEC (the rule (9) above), B’s follow up questions are justified as seeking
elaboration of the existentially quantified proposition 9P IllocRel(spkr,P( j)):
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(38) LatestMove =
2666666666664
sit = u1
sit-type=
2666666664
phon : “John”
dgb-params :
"
j : Ind
s0 : Rec
#
cont = lP:Pred .
24sit = s0
sit-type =
h
c1:P(j)
i35: (Pred!Prop)
3777777775
3777777777775
As for (2b), this follows by applying the forward looking utterance rule, where the addressee
takes over.
5.4. Sluicing, incrementally
We assume, following Cooper (2013a) that a QNP such as ‘someone’ has a content of the form
(39), where q-params constitute descriptive content that, in contrast to the dgb-params, does
not require instantiation.
(39)
266666664
q-params:
"
restr = person: Ppty
witness : 9(restr)
#
P : Ppty
cont =
"
scope = P :Ppty
c1 = witness : 9(restr,scope)
#
: Rtype
377777775
We assume a constructional specification for a sluice as in (40), deriving from Ginzburg (2012).
A sluice denotes a question (i.e., a function from records into propositions) whose domain is
the type denoted by the wh-phrase and whose range is that given by MaxQUD’s proposition
where the wh-phrase’s variable is substituted for that associated with the antecedent:
(40) sluice-int-cl.cont = (whP.rest)MaxQUD.prop[antecedent.x 7!whP.x]
The sluice is triggered by utterance prediction that LatestMove is A asserts that Someone P’ed.
This gives rise to QUD update, via Assertion QUD-incrementation with (41a) as maximal el-
ement of QUD and the antecedent for a sluice, as in (41b), which is predicted to mean (41c)
immediately after it is uttered:
(41) a. ?9x,P[Person(x) ^ P(x)]
b. A: Someone . . . B: Who?
c. ‘Who is that person (that has some as yet uninstantiated property)?’
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6. Conclusions and further Work
In this paper we provide data related to the potential for clarification, repair, and sluicing in
mid-utterance. This data shows that the “competence grammar” must be formulated in a way
that enables incremental (minimally word by word and even mid-word) semantic composition
to be effected. In particular, this data constitutes an argument for incremental access to the
contextual repository QUD. This approach has parallels to Dynamic Syntax (Kempson et al.,
2001), and particularly recent dialogue-friendly versions (Purver et al., 2011; Kempson et al.,
2016), where the central idea is online, incremental construction of meaning representations.
However, the incremental account presented here not only allows the representation of utter-
ances, but the internal state of a dialogue agent, including background beliefs and the events in
the situated context, to be updated online for entire interactions. In a more detailed presenta-
tion we will present a small grammar/context fragment. In future work we hope to investigate
experimentally the processing of data of the kind presented here.
References
Barwise, J. (1989). The Situation in Logic. CSLI Lecture Notes. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Clark, H. (1996). Using Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cooper, R. (2012). Type theory and semantics in flux. In R. Kempson, N. Asher, and T. Fer-
nando (Eds.),Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 14: Philosophy of Linguistics.
Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Cooper, R. (2013a). Clarification and generalized quantifiers. Dialogue and Discourse 4, 1–25.
Cooper, R. (2013b). Update conditions and intensionality in a type-theoretic approach to dia-
logue semantics. In Proceedings of SemDial 2013 (DialDam), pp. 15–24. Citeseer.
Cooper, R. (2016). Type theory and language: From perception to linguistic communication.
Book Draft.
Cooper, R., S. Dobnik, S. Larsson, and S. Lappin (2015). Probabilistic type theory and natural
language semantics. Linguistic Issues in Language Technology 10(4).
Cooper, R. and J. Ginzburg (2015). Type theory with records for natural language semantics.
In C. Fox and S. Lappin (Eds.), Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory, 2nd edition.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Ferna´ndez, R. (2006). Non-Sentential Utterances in Dialogue: Classification, Resolution and
Use. Ph. D. thesis, King’s College, London.
Gardent, C. and M. Kohlhase (1997). Computing parallelism in discourse. IJCAI, 1016–1021.
Ginzburg, J. (1994). An update semantics for dialogue. In H. Bunt (Ed.), Proceedings of the
1st International Workshop on Computational Semantics. Tilburg: ITK, Tilburg University.
Ginzburg, J. (2012). The Interactive Stance: Meaning for Conversation. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Ginzburg, J., R. Ferna´ndez, and D. Schlangen (2014). Disfluencies as intra-utterance dialogue
moves. Semantics and Pragmatics 7(9), 1–64.
Ginzburg, J. and M. Purver (2012). Quantification, the reprise content hypothesis, and type
theory. In L. Borin and S. Larsson (Eds.), From Quantification to Conversation: Festschrift
for Robin Cooper on the occasion of his 65th Birthday, pp. 85–110. College Publications.
This paper appeared in an online version of this collection in 2008.
J. Ginzburg, R. Cooper, J. Hough, & D. Schlangen Incrementality and clarification/sluicing potential
Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 21
Edited by Robert Truswell, Chris Cummins, Caroline Heycock, Brian Rabern, and Hannah Rohde
479
Hough, J. (2015). Modelling Incremental Self-Repair Processing in Dialogue. Ph. D. thesis,
Queen Mary, University of London.
Hough, J., C. Kennington, D. Schlangen, and J. Ginzburg (2015). Incremental semantics for
dialogue processing: Requirements, and a comparison of two approaches. In Proceedings of
the 11th International Conference on Computational Semantics (IWCS).
Jurafsky, D. and J. H. Martin (2009). Speech and Language Processing (2nd ed.). New Jersey:
Prentice Hall.
Kempson, R., R. Cann, E. Gregoromichelaki, and S. Chatzikyriakidis (2016). Language as
mechanisms for interaction. Theoretical Linguistics 42(3-4), 203–276.
Kempson, R., W. Meyer-Viol, and D. Gabbay (2001). Dynamic Syntax: The Flow of Language
Understanding. Oxford: Blackwell.
Larsson, S. (2002). Issue based Dialogue Management. Ph. D. thesis, Gothenburg University.
Levelt, W. J. (1983). Monitoring and self-repair in speech. Cognition 14(4), 41–104.
Merchant, J. (2001). The Syntax of Silence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Milward, D. (1991). Axiomatic Grammar, Non-Constituent Coordination and Incremental In-
terpretation. Ph. D. thesis, University of Cambridge.
Milward, D. and R. Cooper (1994). Incremental interpretation: Applications, theory, and re-
lationship to dynamic semantics. In Proceedings of the 15th conference on Computational
linguistics-Volume 2, pp. 748–754. ACL.
Peldszus, A. and D. Schlangen (2012). Incremental construction of robust but deep seman-
tic representations for use in responsive dialogue systems. In Proceedings of the Coling
Workshop on Advances in Discourse Analysis and its Computational Aspects.
Pollard, C. and I. A. Sag (1994). Head Driven Phrase Structure Grammar. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press and CSLI.
Purver, M. (2006). Clarie: Handling clarification requests in a dialogue system. Research on
Language & Computation 4(2), 259–288.
Purver, M., A. Eshghi, and J. Hough (2011). Incremental semantic construction in a dialogue
system. In J. Bos and S. Pulman (Eds.), Proceedings of the 9th IWCS, pp. 365–369.
Purver, M. and J. Ginzburg (2004). Clarifying noun phrase semantics. Journal of Seman-
tics 21(3), 283–339.
Sato, Y. (2011). Local ambiguity, search strategies and parsing in dynamic syntax. The Dy-
namics of Lexical Interfaces, 205–233.
Schegloff, E. (2007). Sequence Organization in Interaction. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Schlangen, D. and G. Skantze (2009). A general, abstract model of incremental dialogue pro-
cessing. In Proceedings of the 12th Conference of the European Chapter of the Association
for Computational Linguistics, pp. 710–718. Association for Computational Linguistics.
Schlangen, D. and G. Skantze (2011). A general, abstract model of incremental dialogue pro-
cessing. Dialogue & Discourse 2(1), 83–111.
Schlesewsky, M. and I. Bornkessel (2004). On incremental interpretation: Degrees of meaning
accessed during sentence comprehension. Lingua 114(9–10), 1213–1234.
Tian, Y., T. Murayama, and J. Ginzburg (2016). Hesitation markers and self addressed ques-
tions. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research.
Vallduvı´, E. (2015). Information structure. In M. Aloni and P. Dekker (Eds.), The Cambridge
Handbook of Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
J. Ginzburg, R. Cooper, J. Hough, & D. Schlangen Incrementality and clarification/sluicing potential
Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 21
Edited by Robert Truswell, Chris Cummins, Caroline Heycock, Brian Rabern, and Hannah Rohde
480
